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An agronomic crop growth model—the Decision Support System for Agro-Technology
Transfer—and a constant relative risk aversion utility function are used to examine corn
irrigation strategies in Mitchell County, Georgia. Precipitation contracts are designed to
help farmers manage risk. Three conclusions originate from the findings. First, the optimal
irrigation strategy can greatly increase producers’ certainty-equivalent revenue. Second,
changes in water pricing policy would have a limited impact on the amount of water used.
And third, across levels of risk preference, the precipitation contracts are not effective in
increasing certainty-equivalent revenue or reducing cumulative water use.
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Agricultural production has always been a
risky endeavor, with stochastic weather con-
ditions affecting farm production and revenue,
and irrigation has been identified as an
important risk management strategy (Boggess
et al.). In Georgia, although annual rainfall is
adequate for most agricultural crops, the
distribution of rainfall across a year is highly
unpredictable. Irrigation is extensively used in
Georgia to offset the impact of rainfall
variability on crop yield and to reduce the
risk associated with weather variability.
Recently, water scarcity has become a
social and economic concern for policymakers
in Georgia. Since irrigated agriculture has
historically represented the largest consump-
tive use in the state, a comprehensive water
policy for Georgia’s future must address
agricultural water demand. Simulation tools
provide the opportunity to analyze water use
efficiency and its impact on water scarcity
(Morgan, Biere, and Kanemasu). Several
studies have examined on-farm irrigation
using the engineering notion of irrigation
water (i.e., the ratio of water stored in the
crop root zone to the total water diverted for
irrigation) and have found opportunities for
water savings while increasing yield (e.g.,
Harris and Mapp 1980, 1988; Howell, Hiler,
and Reddell; Lyle and Bordovsky; Raju et al).
While engineering studies have addressed
the changes and the diffusion of irrigation
technologies in agriculture, they often lack
economic intuition. The decision environment
is typically nonoptimizing—with the exception
of yield maximization—and the issue of risk is
rarely considered.
In the financial world, new insurance
instruments (catastrophe options, weather
derivative contracts, and so on) are being
developed to improve farmers’ risk manage-
ment options (Miranda and Vedenov). There
are currently markets for temperature-based
weather derivatives traded on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange as well as more personal
markets for over-the-counter weather deriva-
tives exchanged in the form of weather swaps
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weather derivatives based on temperature
indices has grown significantly, the market
for precipitation-based derivatives is still in its
infancy, making it a natural area for further
research (Varangis, Skees, and Barnett).
The primary objective of this paper is to
present a theoretical framework of irrigation
water decisions when weather derivatives are
available. The framework is then applied to
corn production in southwest Georgia. The
application illustrates the impact of both
water price and risk preferences on the
financial parameters defining the optimal
weather derivative as well as their impact on
expected water applications.
Literature Review
Advances in the understanding of the physical,
chemical, and biological environment of the
soil–plant– atmosphere continuum and envi-
ronmental monitoring technology offer us the
opportunity to base crop performance and
assessment on sound scientific principles
(Jagtap et al.). A number of studies have used
simulation models to evaluate irrigation
schedules based on plant growth relationships
(e.g., Harris and Mapp; Howell, Hiler, and
Reddell; Lyle and Bordovsky). The primary
contributions of these studies have been
improved specifications of the agronomic
relationships describing the irrigation–plant
growth environment and incorporation of
multiple crops into the decision framework.
For example, Zavaleta, Lacewell, and
Taylor use the grain sorghum growth model
by Maas and Arkin to consider stochastic
weather and allow irrigation timing and
quantity decisions to be based on an expected
profit maximization criterion. Numeric search
procedures, referred to as open-loop stochastic
control, are used to derive irrigation strategies
that maximize expected profits over eight
discrete irrigation periods of the crop year.
Harris and Mapp (1988) use the same grain
sorghum plant growth model to analyze
intensive and water-conserving irrigation
strategies. A number of irrigation strategies
are simulated with their modifications to the
plant growth model. Stochastic dominance
procedures are used to identify risk efficient
irrigation strategies.
Endale and Fipps apply the Irrigation
District Decision Support System, a crop
growth and irrigation district simulation model
capable of predicting biomass development and
yields for fields varying in soil type and
irrigation management scenarios, to a large
irrigation scheme in the Middle Awash Valley of
Ethiopia. Crop yields are simulated over a 12-
year period to determine which of 12 separate
irrigation schedules in use meet the objectives of
maximizing yields or minimizing water use.
Their results illustrate the potential role of
decision support systems in the evaluation and
management of large irrigation projects.
Apart from irrigation, farmers also choose
insurance products to improve their risk
profile (Schnitkey, Sherrick, and Irwin). The
flexibility of defining weather indices allows
innovative structures to be developed using
these instruments to manage a wide variety of
weather-related risks (Mahul). Sellers of
weather derivatives usually include major
energy companies that use the instruments to
hedge their own risks and to make trading
profits. Insurance and reinsurance companies
are also important providers of capacity as
they look for alternative ways to deploy their
capital. Weather derivatives appeal to a wide
array of investors as an uncorrelated asset
class.
Richards, Manfredo, and Sanders found
that a temperature-based weather index insur-
ance product could be used to offset produc-
tion risks faced by nectarine growers in Fresno
County, California. Skees et al. found that a
rainfall index insurance scheme could be
feasible in Morocco and Argentina. Turvey
examined the economics and pricing of
weather index insurance in Ontario and
suggested that temperature and precipitation-
based insurance contracts could be used to
insure against yield losses for some crops.
Vedenov and Barnett investigated the feasibil-
ity of using weather index insurance to protect
against shortfalls in corn and soybean yields in
Iowa and Illinois and cotton yields in Mis-
sissippi and Georgia.
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In order to study the decision problem of a
risk-averse competitive agricultural producer
under output price and weather risks, we used
an expected utility maximizing model. The
objective was to maximize the expected value
of a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility func-
tion of profit u(p), with u9.0a n du0,0. As
empirical studies have demonstrated that
farmers in many areas exhibit decreasing
absolute risk aversion (Escalante and Rejesus),
that is,
R0
a y ðÞ ~
{u000u0 z u002
u02 v 0
given that u9.0, u0,0, a necessary condition
fordecreasingabsoluteriskaversionisu999.0.
A widely used representation of expected
utility that satisfies the maintained hypothesis
of u9.0, u0,0, and u999 . 0 is the constant






where R is the return to the decision maker
and j is the relative risk aversion coefficient.
This model is employed in this paper to
examine irrigation strategies and precipitation
contract design across different levels of risk
aversion coefficients.
Expected farm yield, revenues and costs
for various irrigation strategies were generated
by the Decision Support System for Agro-
Technology Transfer (DSSAT). We were then
able to identify the plant-available water
threshold that maximized the expected utility
function.
Certainty-equivalent revenues (CERs) were
used to assess the robustness of the risk
reduction performance of the optimal irriga-
tion and precipitation contract (Manfredo and
Leuthold). For a specified utility function,
CER is the level of return that, if received with
certainty, would generate a level of utility
equal to the expected utility of the risky
investment. While it allows for consideration
of higher moments of the return distribution,
CER also requires one to make assumptions
about the decision maker’s utility function
over returns (Chen, Roberts, and Thraen).
Using the utility function in Equation (1), the
CERs can be calculated as
ð2Þ CER ~ 1 { j ðÞ EU R ðÞ ðÞ ð
1
1 { j:
The critical components in the precipita-
tion contract design involve setting the indem-
nity payments and the premium of the
contract. Indemnity refers to the payments
made to the holder of the contract when
events as specified in the contract trigger a
payment. The proposed insurance product
would function much like a put option on
precipitation. In particular, the precipitation
contract envisaged here is designed to trigger a
payment when rainfall in the said time period
falls short of a certain set strike rainfall
amount. The indemnity is paid conditional
on the realization of the precipitation accord-
ing to the following schedule:
ð3Þ
fi x ,i ,l j ðÞ ~ x |
0
i  { i
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1
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where f (i|x, i*, l) is the indemnity, i is the
rainfall index for a specific period measured
not at the farm as in Equation (3) (in the crop
simulation model) but rather at the weather
station referenced in the insurance contract, i*
is the strike, and x is the maximum indemnity.
The contract triggers an indemnity whenever i
falls below i*, and the maximum indemnity x
is paid whenever the index falls below the limit
l*i. Thus, the contract can be uniquely
identified by fixing the three parameters i*,
l,a n dx.
The premium on the precipitation standard
contract is a function of i*, l, x and the
probability distribution of i. The distribution
can be estimated based on historical precipi-
tation data either by fitting a standard
parametric distribution or by using a non-
parametric approach such as kernel smooth-
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to derive a continuous probability density
function h(i)o fi. Formally, for index realiza-
tions i; t 5 1 , ...,T, the kernel density











where K(?) is a kernel function, and D is a
degree of smoothness or bandwidth (Ha ¨rdle).
The expected payoff and hence the actuarially
fair premium for the standard contract can be
determined by
ð5Þ
pfair x,i ,l ðÞ ~
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This formulation for calculating the pure
premium is based on the pure loss cost history
and does not cover the transaction costs or
risk preference of partners. Reinsurance firms
usually load the pure premium based on the
variance of the loss costs. If one further
assumes that a proportional premium load
c(c $ 0) is applied to the actuarially fair
premium to cover transaction costs, return on
investment, and reserve building, then the
loaded premium is
ð6Þ ploaded i ,l,c ðÞ ~ 1 z c ðÞ pfair:
For the purposes of this study, a 10% load
is imposed on the standard deviations of
indemnity payments per liability. Using the
previous procedure, preliminary estimates for
indemnity payments, pure premium rates, and
loaded premium rates (the ratio of premium to
maximum liability) for Mitchell County can be
arrived at given strike, limit, and liability.
The irrigation cost during the worst years is
considered a good proxy for the value at risk
and used to establish a liability estimate by crop.
Strikes are selected as the levels of precipitation
at which the predicted yields are equal to the
corresponding longtime average; that is, the
contracts are designed to pay at least some
indemnity whenever predicted yields dropped
below the average. Similar index insurance
contract designs are presented in Martin,
Barnett, and Coble. The remaining parameters
for the contract are the strikes i* and limit
parameter l, which can be solved as follows.
Suppose a producer values investment
returns according to maximizing the expected
value of the previously mentioned utility
function. Further suppose a representative
producer’s investment portfolio consists only
of irrigation application and precipitation
contracts. The mathematical formulation of
the farm level model is as presented here:
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where E denotes the expectation operator,
NRwithout denotes net return to an irrigated
farm without weather derivative contract for a
specific year t, Cpumping denotes per unit
irrigation cost, w denotes irrigation amount,
q denotes crop yield, P denotes crop price, ft
denotes instrument payoff (indemnity) for
year t, p is contract premium, and A denotes
relative risk aversion coefficient.
The decision variables, namely, the strike,
the limit parameter l, and irrigation amount
w, are selected for each analysis unit so as to
maximize the expected utility function over a
historic period (1976–2000). Once the contract
parameters strike, liability and limit are
solved, and indemnity payments and premium
rates can be formulated.
Data
The DSSAT crop growth model utilizes crop
management data, daily weather data, and soil
data. The economic model requires output
price data and crop management cost data.
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National Climate Data Center. Evapotranspi-
ration rates are calculated from daily weather
data using Priestley–Taylor methods. The
climate data can be plotted or tabulated and
saved as a prm climate file. Soil information
came from the University of Georgia’s Agri-
cultural Economics Extension Program. Three
common soil types in Georgia (Norgram
Sandy Soil, Tifton Loamy Sand, and Norfolk
Loamy Sand) are included in the study.
Results
The results are organized as follows. The first
section provides evidence that irrigation is a
viable tool in farm-level risk management and
analyzes the impact of water pricing policy on
expected water use. Regional estimates for the
precipitation insurance are developed for the
study area. The third section provides analysis
on the impact of the precipitation contract on
irrigation decision and risk management.
Irrigation in Farm-Level Risk Management
Figure 1 shows the impact of the optimal
irrigation strategy on producers’ CER for corn
production in Mitchell County. From this
graph, we can see that the CER of the optimal
irrigation ranges from two to nearly five times
the CER for dryland production. Across all
soil types and risk aversion levels, irrigation is
shown to be an effective risk management tool
for corn production.
The impact of water price on expected
water use is shown in Figure 2. This graph
indicates that water application rates that
maximize expected utility are independent of
water price and risk aversion coefficients over
wide ranges. Soil type, however, does have an
impact on expected water use.
Regional Estimates for Precipitation Contracts
Table 1 present optimal combinations of i*
and l for three soil types in Mitchell County.
These are the combinations that yield the
largest expected utility for a specific risk
aversion level j. The variety of indices and
contract types presented from Table 1 indi-
cates that weather derivatives cannot be
designed in a one-size-fits-all manner, even
for the same crop within the same area.
The optimal strike is much smaller than the
average precipitation, resulting in 0 payoff in
most of years, and thus the fair premium is 0.
The probability of triggering a payment for
Mitchell County is very low. This is why the
premium rate on the contract is also very low.
Figure 1. Impact of the Optimal Irrigation on Producers’ Certainty Equivalent Revenue for
Corn Production in Mitchell County
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associated with the weather contracts turned
out to be low, ranging from 1.4% to 2.8% of
maximum liability for both risk aversion
levels.
Impact of Precipitation Contract on Irrigation
and Risk Management
Table 2 presents changes in producers’ irriga-
tion decision from purchasing precipitation
insurance as well as changes in producers’
well-being as measured by CER. The CER are
calculated using i*a n dl from Table 2 for r 5
6a n dr 5 1.5, respectively. From the table, we
can see that a weather derivative based on
rainfall does not change a producer’s irriga-
tion decisions for any soil type, regardless of
the level of risk aversion. Unexpectedly, risk-
averse corn producers in Mitchell County are
not generally made better off by purchasing
rain-based insurance contracts. The optimal
strikes are much lower than the expected
rainfall during the growing season, making the
indemnity each year very low, and leads to low
fair premium and loaded premium rates. As a
result, producers gain little from buying
weather derivative contracts each year, and
the 10% proportional load only increases their
cost. If the weather derivative contract is
applied on nonirrigated crops, it may increase
producers’ utility because of its role in
variance reduction, but in our case, with
irrigation application, the variance of profits
during the 25 years is already much lower than
that for nonirrigated crops.
Figure 2. Impact of Potential Water Pricing Policy on Producers’ Optimal Water Use for
Mitchell County
Table 1. Contract Parameters for Corn Production in Mitchell County
Soil r max_liability expected_rain Strike Limit Tick premium_rate
1 1.5 700.03 564.76 132 0.76 7.56 0.01447
1 6 700.03 564.76 132 0.76 7.56 0.01447
2 1.5 512.12 564.76 132 0.84 7.14 0.02162
2 6 512.12 564.76 132 0.84 7.14 0.02162
3 1.5 471.82 564.76 132 0.77 3.78 0.02775
3 6 471.82 564.76 132 0.77 3.94 0.02775
r is relative risk aversion level; max_liability is maximum liability.
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Crop simulation models offer new opportuni-
ties to explore potential impacts ofwater policy
and financial instruments on farm welfare. We
used the DSSAT model to simulate yield,
revenue, and irrigation cost responses to
various irrigation strategies over 25 years.
Our analysis provides evidence that irrigation
is an important risk management strategy for
corn production in Georgia. However, because
of the supplemental nature of irrigation in the
state, optimal water application rates for corn
appear to be largely independent of water price
and risk aversion levels.
Given the recent rise in corn prices, irri-
gated corn acreage in Georgia is expected to
increase substantially in 2008. This could have
a significant impact on water withdrawals,
especially if the current drought continues, as
expected. Our analysis suggests water price
adjustments would do little to dampen water
demand on corn acres. This conclusion
appears to hold even if rain-based insurance
contracts were available.
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